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GENDER AND SECURITIES LAW IN THE
SUPREME COURT
Lyman Johnson, Michelle Harner & Jason A. Cantone

INTRODUCTION
The 2010 appointment of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme
Court meant that, for the first time, three female justices would serve
together on that court.1 The appointment, among both supporters and
detractors, was recognized as historic.2 Less clear, then and now, is
whether Justice Kagan’s gender will really matter in how she votes as a
justice. This question is an especially visible aspect of a larger issue: do
female judges display gendered voting patterns in the cases that come
before them?3
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David Jackson, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan to Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2010,
6:59 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2010/08/supreme-court-justice-elenakagan-confirmed-by-senate/1.
2
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, High-court Divide Has a New Dynamic, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/02/AR2010100203956.html;
Press
Release, National Organization for Women, NOW Applauds President Obama’s Historic Nomination to
Supreme Court (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.now.org/press/05-10/05-10.html.
3
See infra Part II.
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Understandably, with relatively few women judges serving on
American courts until the latter part of the 20th century, the relationship of
gender and judicial voting patterns has received serious scholarly attention
for fewer than twenty years.4
Numerous studies, using diverse
methodologies, have examined the voting behavior of women judges sitting
on different courts and ruling on a variety of substantive law issues. Along
with these empirical findings, several theories have been advanced as to
why women judges might—and might not—be expected to vote differently
than their male colleagues on particular legal subjects.5
This article makes a novel contribution to the growing literature on
female voting patterns. We investigated whether female justices on the
United States Supreme Court voted differently than, or otherwise
influenced, male justices on securities law issues decided by that court over
the four decades spanning the years 1971-2010. To our knowledge, no
prior empirical study has examined gender and judging in the securities
area on any court, and only one study has assessed that topic in the related
field of corporate law.6
Our study’s findings revealed no discernible gender impact on the
outcome of securities cases in the Supreme Court. Neither female Justices
on an individual basis, nor panels including female Justices, showed any
significant difference in the resolution of securities law issues. In this
respect, our findings are consistent with the majority of judicial voting
studies showing that gender primarily impacts judicial decision-making in
cases involving feminist issues, particularly sex discrimination.7 They also
tend to support, indirectly, the position that females in the corporate
boardroom may not change decision outcomes.8
Nevertheless, our data do suggest several interesting and meaningful
trends in securities cases involving female Justices. For example, a
comparison between all-male panels and female-included panels showed
that a female-included panel was marginally more likely to leave open the
possibility of sanctions for securities violations, as opposed to declining to
impose sanctions altogether, which an all-male panel most often held.9
All-male panels also were more likely than female-included panels to
demonstrate a pro-corporate bias, measured by whether the Court held for
the corporate party and whether that corporate party was the defendant in
the lower court action.10
4

Id.
Id.
6
See Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging,
54
AM.
J.
POL.
SCI.
389,
390,
397
(2010),
available
at
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/genderjudging.pdf.
7
See infra Part II.B.
8
Id.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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A further breakdown of the female-included panels suggests that
although the Court ruled in favor of corporations and found for the
petitioner a majority of the time under panels with Justice O’Connor and
Justice Ginsburg, as well as Ginsburg-only panels,11 such an outcome was
less prevalent than with all-male panels. However, only a small percentage
of cases yielded these pro-corporate results when O’Connor was the only
female Justice. In addition, our data revealed that unanimous verdicts were
reached more often with female-included panels.12 Accordingly, our data
tend to suggest that female Justices may induce collaboration among the
Justices and produce a panel effect on the Court’s deliberation process—
findings similar to those in the corporate boardroom context where some
commentators suggest that female board members add this intangible value
to the decision-making process.13
Part II of this article provides background and context for our study by
briefly summarizing the current state of the scholarly literature on female
judges’ voting patterns. Part III describes the methodology of our study.
Part IV reports our findings in detail, offers analysis of certain striking
findings on female justice involvement in the securities law area, and
suggests directions for future study.
In addition, by collecting and assessing case data reaching back almost
forty years, our study establishes a baseline for determining whether the
unprecedented presence of a third female Justice, Elena Kagan, will itself
influence voting patterns on our highest court in different ways in the years
ahead. This is especially important given the Supreme Court’s recent
renewed interest in securities cases,14 and the likelihood it will decide
many more such cases in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, also a historic
legal development of 2010.15
11

See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.B.
14
In the term that just ended in June 2011, the Supreme Court issued three decisions on securities
law issues and a fourth decision, which, although centered more generally on class action lawsuits,
holds important implications for securities litigation. The three securities decisions are Janus Capital
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011), and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). The
class action ruling, while dealing with an employment dispute, addressed the requirements for member
inclusion in a class more generally and will dramatically affect, not only current mortgage securities
litigation, but also other securities class actions. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2550-52 (U.S. 2011). In addition, for the current October 2011 term, the Supreme Court has agreed to
hear another important case. See Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds, 638 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
15
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been involved in at
least one significant case concerning the exercise of its new authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. See
Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Although the
SEC has indicated that it will not seek a rehearing or appeal the Business Roundtable decision, other
litigation is likely to arise as the rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act take effect and the SEC
continues to test its new authority under the Act. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
12
13
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I. THE STATE OF THE GENDER AND JUDGING LITERATURE
A. Theories
Prior scholarship exploring the impact of gender on judicial voting has
focused on two main questions: whether female judges vote differently
than male judges on particular legal issues − typically referred to as
“individual effects” — and whether the presence of a female judge affects
her colleagues’ voting behavior — commonly referred to as a “panel
effect.”16 Both in theoretical and empirical terms, the field has been highly
fractured, with different studies in the same area reaching mixed findings.17
We first describe existing theories and then turn to the actual findings of
various studies.
Theories in the gender and judging field can be divided into four
schools of thought. The first school became known as the different voice
theory, named after Carol Gilligan’s work, In a Different Voice.18 Gilligan
and her followers believe that men and women develop different
worldviews due to their different experiences, and therefore, that they
relate to and perceive society in different ways.19 As applied to judicial
voting patterns, the different voice theory predicts differences in behavior
between a female judge and her male counterpart over a broad range of
issues.20 However, the theory does not expect much cross-influence
between male and female worldviews and therefore, would not expect the
presence of a female judge to produce a panel effect on her male
colleagues.21
The second theory, called representational theory, is influenced by
Hanna Pitkin’s work, The Concept of Representation.22
The
representational account holds that female judges represent other females
before the law, and that they will rule to protect the gender’s interest in

Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm; see also, Matthew Ingber, Litigation: Dodd-Frank:
One Year Later, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 28, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/07/28/litigationdodd-frank-one-year-later (discussing, among other topics, potential litigation in connection with the
SEC’s broader authority concerning aiding and abetting claims).
16
See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 389.
17
See, e.g., Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of
Justices on Two North American Supreme Courts, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 265, 266 (2009); Madhavi McCall,
Structuring Gender’s Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases, 36 AM. POL. RES. 264,
265-66 (2008). See also Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Justice: Parity and the United States Supreme
Court, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 51 n.36 (2007) (listing representative studies).
18
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
19
See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
See generally HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (University of California Press
1967).
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litigation.23 The theory is narrower than the different voice theory, and
places its main emphasis on women’s issues such as abortion, affirmative
action, sex discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment.24
Representational theory expects individual effects only on the issues that
“‘are likely to have a more immediate and direct impact upon significantly
larger numbers of women than men.’”25 As with different voice theory,
representational theory does not anticipate any panel effects on male
judges.26
The third theory, known as informational theory, focuses on the unique
experiences and valuable information on which female judges can draw to
decide cases and influence male colleagues.27 Informational theory
predicts individual effects only where particular female judges have
expertise or knowledge beyond their understanding of the law.28
Informational theory also predicts panel effects in cases that exhibit
individual effects because male judges are expected to find their female
colleagues possessing credible and persuasive information gained from
their gender specific experiences in certain areas.29
The fourth theory, commonly called the organizational account,
emphasizes the commonalities among all judges: similar experiences in law
school, similar work experiences, identical confirmation procedures, and
identical constraints through the practice of following precedent.30
Organizational theory predicts that these common professional experiences
will overcome any gender-based differences.31 The theory therefore posits
that there will be no individual or panel effects in any area of the law, when
viewed along gender lines.32
23

See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390–91.
See id.
25
Susan J. Carroll, Women Candidates and Support for Feminist Concerns: The Closet Feminist
Syndrome, 37 W. POL. Q. 307, 308 (1984).
26
See id. Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390–91.
27
See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 391–92.
28
See id.
29
See, e.g., id. at 392.
30
See id.
31
See id. (citing Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the
Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendant?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163, 1165 (1999)).
32
Social psychological theories can also be used to explain gender differences. Self-referencing
posits that, when a person makes a decision about how others perceive a situation, they first consider
how they would respond. Self-referencing research has found that women, as compared to men, are
more likely to find that Title VII sexual discrimination has occurred, partially because they are more
likely to have experienced sexual harassment. See generally Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How
Do People Evaluate Social Sexual Conduct at Work? A Psycholegal Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
75, 75-85 (2000); Maria Rotundo, Dung-Hanh Nguyen & Paul R. Sackett, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 914, 914-22 (2001).
Self-referencing research could explain prior research on how female Justices differ in their Title VII
decisions. A Social Identity Theory model postulates that people do not use themselves as the anchor
for analysis but, rather, protect members of their in-groups and discriminate against out-groups. See
generally Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior in
24
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B. Findings
Scholars have explored a wide variety of case law in searching for and
measuring gender effects. Studies typically seek to control for ideology or
political party, and will often control for several other factors, which may
include the makeup of the court the judge sits on, region, the age of the
judge, the year of decision, the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court,
or the direction of the lower court decision.33
In criminal law studies, to illustrate, the findings of the effect of gender
on judicial voting have been mixed. McCall examined cases with strong
and moderate gender interest,34 and found individual effects and panel
effects in both areas.35 However, McCall also found significant gender
effects in search and seizure cases, where there is no identifiable gender
factor, suggesting the gender effect in criminal law goes beyond only those
cases directly affecting women.36 Davis also found that female judges
were approximately 7% more likely than male judges to vote liberally in
search and seizure cases.37 Songer, however, found no gender difference in
search and seizure cases.38
Songer and Crews-Meyer examined gender in the context of capital
punishment cases and found both individual and panel effects, although
surprisingly, only male judges—not female—showed signs of the panel
effect.39 This suggests that female judges have little or no effect on each
other in this area. However, more recently, Boyd, Epstein and Martin
examined capital penalty cases in their thirteen-part study and found
neither individual nor panel effects.40
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 7–24 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986).
While Social Identity Theory has not been found to predict how men and women perceive alleged acts
of sexual harassment, in-group/out-group perceptions play a role in how men and women perceive
alleged acts of religious discrimination in workplace settings. See Jason A. Cantone & Richard L.
Wiener, Religion at Work: Evaluating Religiously Hostile Work Environment, presented at 2011 Annual
American Psychological Association Conference in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 2011) (on file with
authors).
33
See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 397; McCall, supra note 17, at 269-81; Donald R. Songer &
Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decisionmaking in State Supreme Courts, 81
SOC. SCI. Q. 750, 754-56 (2000).
34
See McCall, supra note 17, at 272. McCall categorized the area of domestic abuse as one of
strong gender interest and the subject of juveniles being tried as adults as one of moderate gender
interest.
35
Id. at 286-87.
36
See id. at 285.
37
Sue Davis, Susan Haire, & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 132 (1993) [hereinafter Voting Behavior].
38
Id. at 98 (citing Donald Songer, Sue Davis, & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in
the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 433-34 (1994)).
39
See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 757 (2000) (finding a 14% increase in likelihood
of a liberal vote in death penalty cases if the judge was female).
40
Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 406 (concluding that the presence of women in the judiciary rarely
has an appreciable empirical effect).

DO NOT DELETE

No. 1]

6/3/2012 4:25 PM

Gender and Securities Law in the Supreme Court

7

Songer and Crews-Meyer also examined gender effects in obscenity
cases and found that a female judge was 15% more likely than her male
counterpart to be less restrictive of allegedly obscene materials.41
However, Davis’ study disputes this finding by reporting no significant
differences in general voting patterns in obscenity cases.42
Unlike other areas of the law, studies examining Title VII sex
discrimination cases have consistently reported substantial gender effects.43
These studies have found that a female judge is between 10% to 37% more
likely than her male counterpart to vote for the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination case.44 Panel effects have also consistently been found in
sex discrimination cases, with one study finding a 12-14% increase in the
likelihood of the plaintiff winning if one member of the panel was
female,45 and another finding that the plaintiff’s chance of winning an
average male judge’s vote tripled in that same situation.46
Many scholars have attempted to explain why gender effects have
consistently been found in Title VII sex discrimination cases but have not
been consistently found in any other area. Proponents of the different voice
theory believe that it is gender itself that makes a difference, but are hard
pressed to explain why the gender effects are not widespread.
Representational theory proponents believe that sex discrimination is the
area in which female judges are the most determined to protect their
gender. Informational theory would anticipate a unique gender effect in
sex discrimination cases because many of the women currently on the
bench went to law school in the 1960s or 1970s, where they likely
experienced discrimination both in law school culture and while attempting
to find, or advance in, their jobs.47 For example, Dixon argues that Justices
O’Connor’s and Ginsburg’s high level of support for plaintiffs in sex
discrimination cases is a product of their own experiences of discrimination
throughout their careers.48 She suggests that this experience makes the
justices and other female judges of the same generation more sensitive and
41

Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 757.
See Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37 at 131-33).
43
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment:
A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 312 (2009).
44
Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 401; Kenney, supra note 37, at 98 (citing Donald R. Songer et al.,
supra note 38, at 425-29). See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 312 (citing Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE
L.J. 1759, 1776 (2005) (finding increase of 65% in likelihood of vote for plaintiff in sex discrimination
cases)); Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37, at 131 (finding a
difference of 17%)); Kenney, supra note 37, at 96 (citing Jon Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial
Appointments, 67 JUDICATURE 164, 165-73 (1983) (finding “some” differences between male and
female judges’ votes in sex discrimination cases)).
45
Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 406.
46
See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1778.
47
Dixon, supra note 43, at 306-07 (discussing the discrimination experienced by Justices O’Connor
and Ginsburg).
48
Id.
42
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sympathetic to female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases and therefore
also better able to influence their male peers.49 For Dixon, however, the
effect is likely time-limited because future female judges will be less likely
to have experienced sex discrimination in law school and in the work
place.50
Scholars also have examined a possible link between a judge’s gender
and affiliated political party such that ideology, not gender, may lie behind
voting patterns. Some studies have found that female judges vote for
liberal outcomes more frequently than their male counterparts in at least
some areas.51 Since these liberal votes occurred in the civil liberties area
and mainly in sex discrimination cases, it may well be a residual effect of
the gender difference.52 Other studies have suggested that it is a byproduct of the different impact of gender in each political party. Songer
and Crews-Meyer found in death penalty and obscenity cases, female
judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more liberal than male
judges appointed by the same presidents, but that female judges appointed
by Republican presidents are neither more liberal nor more conservative
than male judges also appointed by Republican presidents.53 Davis had a
similar finding in her study of sex discrimination and search and seizure
cases.54 Songer and Crews-Meyer speculated that this difference might
occur because Democratic presidents perceive a larger political advantage
in appointing liberal female candidates as opposed to women of moderate
political views, while Republican presidents favor women who can argue
“that they are ‘no different’ [politically] from their male competitors.”55
In addition, several studies have specifically analyzed the appointment
and voting records of U.S. Supreme Court female Justices, both as
individuals and as to their influence on their male colleagues. After her
appointment as the first woman on the Supreme Court, for example, Justice
O’Connor voted for the plaintiff in approximately 89% of Title VII sex
discrimination cases.56 After joining the Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg
voted for the plaintiff in 92% of Title VII sex discrimination cases.57
Those voting records are consistent with overall female voting patterns in
Title VII cases. Strikingly, however, O’Connor and Ginsburg’s agreement
in sex discrimination cases did not translate to other areas. In civil
liberties, criminal, and torts cases, Justice O’Connor was more conservative
49

See id. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
See Dixon, supra note 43, at 308.
51
See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 760 (finding that female judges tend to vote more
liberally than male judges in civil liberties cases); see also Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 395 (finding that
female Court of Appeals judges who voted in Title VII sex discrimination lean noticeably to the left).
52
See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 401.
53
See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 758.
54
See Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37, at 129-33).
55
See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 760.
56
See Dixon, supra note 43, at 301.
57
Id.
50
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than Justice Ginsburg and the average male justice, while she was slightly
more liberal than her male colleagues in equality cases.58 On the other
hand, Justice Ginsburg was more liberal than the average male in all four
categories.59 While Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg agree in their support
of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, they consistently agree on little
else.
Justice O’Connor also made a difference in the voting records of her
male peers. After her appointment to the Supreme Court, support for
female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases rose from 63% to 74%, thus
providing evidence of a panel effect by Justice O’Connor on her male
peers.60 However, the addition of Justice Ginsburg — a noted women’s
rights advocate before her appointment — did not significantly change the
Court’s support for women’s rights.61 Davis found that some Justices
increased their support, but other Justices’ support dropped dramatically.62
These studies suggest that appointment of the first woman to a panel is
likely to raise support for women’s rights among male colleagues,
especially in sex discrimination cases, but additional women judges or
justices may meet a more mixed reaction.63 Of course, if the initial female
judge or justice did substantially influence her male colleagues, there might
be little room for further change to male voting patterns by the addition of a
second woman.64 Conversely, where the first woman’s influence is more
modest, the addition of a second (or third) judge or justice may result in
greater changes. This is an important issue, both in the securities area and
more generally, with Justice Kagan as the Supreme Court’s third female
Justice.
In short, studies have found clear signs of gender effects in Title VII
sex discrimination cases but have found decidedly gender-neutral or mixed
outcomes in all other areas.65 This has held true for the Supreme Court,
lower federal courts, and state courts.66
Little theoretical or empirical attention, however, has been given to
possible gender voting differences in the business and commercial law
58

Johnson & Songer, supra note 17, at 270.
Id.
60
Barbara Palmer, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Supreme Court’s Reaction to Its Second
Female Member, 24 WOMEN & POL. 1, 7 (2002) (citing Karen O’Connor & Jeffrey Segal, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor and the Supreme Court’s Reaction to Its First Female Member, 10 WOMEN &
POL. 95, 97 (1990)).
61
See id. at 11 (finding only a 0.9% increase in support for women’s rights claims).
62
See Dixon, supra note 43, at 315-16. In particular, after Justice Ginsburg was appointed, the
Justices appointed before O’Connor (Blackmun, Stevens, and Rehnquist) and some Justices appointed
after O’Connor (Kennedy and Souter) increased their support, while other Justices appointed after
O’Connor (Thomas and Scalia) reduced their support dramatically. Palmer, supra note 60, at 11-14.
63
See Palmer, supra note 60, at 11-14.
64
See id. at 12-14.
65
See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1763 (describing prior studies of state supreme courts and federal
appellate courts). See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 301.
66
See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1762-65. See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 301.
59
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area. Boyd and her co-authors reported in a 2010 study of federal judges
that they found no gender differences in corporate veil piercing cases.67 No
study appears to have examined gender voting patterns in federal securities
cases in the federal court system.
This article seeks to fill that void, providing data and analyses
concerning Supreme Court voting patterns in securities cases both before
and after Justice O’Connor’s appointment to the Court. The article also
draws upon the growing body of literature discussing the presence of
women in corporate boardrooms and the role of women in influencing
group decision-making.68 Although this literature is still developing and is
somewhat inconclusive regarding outcome effects,69 several studies
identify a difference in male and female behaviors in the group decisionmaking context.70 We consider aspects of those studies here to provide a
67

Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 403.
See generally DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM (New York University Press 2007); LOIS JOY ET AL.,
CATALYST INC., THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON
BOARDS (2007), available at www.catalyst.org/publication/200/the-bottom-line-corporate-performanceand-womens-representation-on-boards; VICKI W. KRAMER ET AL., CRITICAL MASS ON CORPORATE
BOARDS: WHY THREE OR MORE WOMEN ENHANCE GOVERNANCE (2006) (This report is available for
purchase
and
the
Executive
Summary
can
be
downloaded
for
free
at
http://www.wcwonline.org/component/option,com_virtuemart/Itemid,217/keyword,kramer/lang,en/pag
e,shop.browse/vmcchk,1/); Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009); Jayne W. Barnard, More Women
on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2007).
69
Compare David Carter et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial
Performance
(Working
Paper,
Mar.
24,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106698 (suggesting positive effects), with
Kathleen A. Farrell & Philip L. Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender, 11 J.
CORP. FIN. 85 (2005) (suggesting no effects). See also, Adams & Ferreira, supra note 68, at 301
(concluding that the fraction of women on corporate boards significantly impacts “the sensitivity of
CEO turnover to stock return performance”); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender
Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 809, 822, 837 (2011) (finding that gender bias of institutional investors impacts firm performance
and, thus, women on corporate boards may negatively influence stock performance).
70
See, e.g., Linda L. Carli, Gender and Group Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF GENDER RESEARCH IN
PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Joan C. Chrisler & Donald R. McReary eds., 2010) (reviewing literature and noting
that “[r]esearch indicates that women exhibit greater amounts of communal behavior than men do, and
men exhibit greater amounts of agentic behavior than women do . . . . [and] women display more
warmth, collaboration, and support.”); Rebecca J. Hannagan & Christopher W. Larimer, Does Gender
Composition Affect Group Decision Outcomes? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment, 32 POL.
BEHAV. 51, 60 (2010) (reviewing literature about the gendered decision making processes and finding
in laboratory comparison that, compared to all male groups, “female and mixed groups produc[ed]
outcomes closer to the universal mean.”); Rebecca J. Hannagan & Christopher W. Larimer, Assessing
Gender Dynamics in Local Government: Results from a Statewide Field Experiment (Feb. 15,
2011)(paper prepared for presentation New Research on Gender in Political Psychology Conference at
Rutgers
University,
Mar.
4-5,
2011),
available
at
http://empowerfitnessevents.com/files/newresearch/ckfinder/files/Larimer%20and%20Hannagan%20%20Assessing%20Gender%20Dynamics%20in%20Local%20Government%202-15-11.doc
(study
finding that “the presence of females tends to dampen down [sic] the variance and bring preferences
closer to the mean.”). See also Drude Dahlerup, The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass, 2 POL. &
68
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more complete picture of the Court’s decisions in securities cases. Taken
together, these various projects provide us with a better understanding of
female influence in an array of institutional settings.
II. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The study’s primary objective is to analyze voting patterns in Supreme
Court cases addressing issues raised under federal securities laws to discern
any effects related to the presence of one or two female Justices on the
bench. As described below, we designed the database to achieve this
particular objective. The database is not, however, restricted to this
purpose. The breadth of the data collected facilitates a broader analysis of
general trends in securities cases and provides a format that can be
supplemented as the gender make-up of the Supreme Court continues to
change over time. The following discussion explains the components of
the case database and the general design and scope of the study.
A. The Case Database
The case database consists of eighty-eight federal securities cases
decided by the Supreme Court between October 1971 and June 2010. This
period captures all securities cases decided by the Supreme Court from ten
years before Justice O’Connor’s first term on the Court in September 1981,
through the last complete session before this study in 2010. During this
period, Justice O’Connor was the only female on the bench until August
1993, at which time Justice Ginsburg joined the Court. Justice O’Connor
resigned from the Court in January 2006; Justice Ginsburg was then the
only female Justice until Justice Sotomayor joined the Court in August
2009.71 Inclusion of the ten-year period of all-male Justice panels prior to

GENDER 511, 519-20 (2006) (arguing that although the exact percentages and measurements of critical
mass theory are of minor importance, increasing women’s political representation remains an important
goal); Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club, 33 J. CORP. L. 665, 679-80
(2008) (criticizing Douglas M. Branson’s argument, supra note 68, that greater board diversity would
not increase corporate performance and explaining other, non-tangible benefits to including women and
increasing diversity on corporate boards); Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter?
Views from the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1079 (2011) (observing that “as female
directors, [respondents] feel more at ease and less like tokens or group representatives when there is a
significant minority of women on the board,” which likely enables board members to function more
effectively) [hereinafter Does Critical Mass Matter?].
71
The database used for this article — with data collection ending as of June 2010 − captures only
the first year of Justice Sotomayor’s service on the Court and does not include any cases decided after
Justice Kagan’s appointment to the Court. We believe this facilitates a retrospective analysis of gender
and securities cases during periods where there was no female Justice or only one or two female
Justices, while also establishing a baseline for studying whether in 2011 and thereafter the presence of
three female Justices alters voting patterns.
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Justice O’Connor’s appointment provides a baseline for several of the
analyses set forth infra Part IV.
We used two different processes to identify cases that satisfied our
subject matter and time period restrictions. First, we searched the Westlaw
Supreme Court Database for all cases decided by the Court between
October 1971 and June 2010 that were coded as “Securities Regulation,” or
included the Securities Act of 1933(“Securities Act”), the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), or the Investment Company Act
of 1940 in the case headnotes. Second, we searched the U.S. Supreme
Court Database for all cases decided by the Court between October 1971
and June 2010 that were coded as “Securities Regulation.” In this second
search, we also reviewed other cases coded as “Economic Activity” cases
to confirm the identification of all securities cases. We then reconciled the
two searches, which yielded forty-eight securities cases decided during the
pre-O’Connor period and forty-three such cases decided subsequent to
Justice O’Connor’s appointment. The large number of cases decided in the
one decade prior to O’Connor’s appointment, in comparison to the number
in the almost three decades thereafter, is itself a striking finding, revealing
an overall dramatic decline in the Court’s attention to securities cases after
the 1970’s.72 We removed three cases after further review because they did
not involve securities law issues, leaving eighty-eight cases for the
database.73

72
Although it is difficult to isolate a single cause for the decline in securities cases decided by the
Court, it is likely attributable to several factors, including the business and social climate of that time
period, the leadership at the SEC, and the makeup of the Court. In fact, at least one study suggests that
“Justices who are ideologically aligned on the merits tend to vote together on certiorari much more
consistently than those Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits, suggesting that there is a
significant merits-oriented component to the Justices’ certiorari formulas.” Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between
Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2008).
73
Given the small sample size, we opted to code and analyze all eighty-eight cases, rather than limit
the sample pool through a random selection process. In addition to the case data collected by the coding
team, we also added information to the database regarding the individual Justices to serve as control
variables in the various analyses. As described infra Part IV, although we found certain striking genderrelated voting patterns, the presence of a female Justice on the Court did not produce any statistically
significant effects on overall case outcomes. Accordingly, we did not find a need to invoke personal
attributes, such as education, socio-economic status, family status, etc., as control variables in
regression analyses. Nevertheless, as noted infra Part IV, anecdotal evidence suggests that ideology
may impact the resolution of securities cases before the Supreme Court and may warrant further study.
Prior studies of judicial decisions in general have suggested an ideological effect. See supra notes 51-55
and accompanying text. See also Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and
How Should We Measure It? 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 135 (2009) (acknowledging that political
“ideology plays a significant role in judicial decision-making,” while criticizing the methods of
measuring political ideology); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology:
Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 235-36 (2009)
(explaining the theory of “judicial politics,” which supports the idea that judges decide the outcome of a
case according to their “ideology.”).
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The data collected and included in the database provides a wealth of
information about the Supreme Court’s conduct in securities cases since
October 1971. The database also can be expanded upon for future studies
to include securities cases decided by the Court after June 2010, thereby
examining Justice Kagan’s voting behavior and influence, as well as to
include a larger cross-section of business law cases that are not specifically
securities law centric. This article, however, specifically reports on genderrelated voting in the securities area.
B. The Study’s Design and Scope
We devoted significant time to creating, testing, and refining the
project-coding scheme. The final coding scheme included twenty primary
variables, with multiple sub-variables, developed specifically to identify
key factors relevant to the questions underlying our study.74 The variables
targeted information in the following general categories: basic case
information, party identities, amici participation, legal issues presented,
holdings of the Court as to whether sanctions were imposed or at least held
open as a possibility, and the different Justices’ votes. A basic description
of each of the variables and sub-variables is set forth in Appendix A. We
tested and refined the coding scheme through multiple practice rounds of
coding with our coding team. We ultimately achieved an acceptable intercoder reliability rate and proceeded to code the eighty-eight cases.75
During the actual study, each member of the coding team worked
independently to code his or her assigned cases. This process required each
member to review the particular Supreme Court decision and information
included in the LEXIS Supreme Court Database regarding amicus briefs
filed in the case.76 Upon completion of the coding, we reviewed and
reconciled any inconsistencies in the database, which required only minor,
non-substantive changes. We then finalized the database and proceeded
with our analyses of the data.
As described below, we performed several sets of analyses with the
data. We first considered the data in the context of general trends in
securities cases. These analyses focused on variables such as legal issues
presented, the presence of amici, and the Court’s holding. These analyses
74

In addition to sub-variables, the coding scheme also included detailed instructions for coding
each variable that were developed through the practice coding rounds. These instructions helped coders
approach each variable in a consistent, objective manner. Some key instructions are included in
footnotes to Appendix A.
75
Across the twenty primary variables and multiple sub-variables, inter-coder reliability between
the five coders was higher than 90% for all variables, with a high of 100% agreement for multiple
variables.
76
An initial review of the Westlaw and LEXIS databases indicated similar but not always identical
inventories of Supreme Court amicus briefs. We instructed all coders to use the LEXIS Supreme Court
Database for the amicus brief variable because one member of the coding team did not have access to
Westlaw and we wanted to maintain consistency in the data collection process.
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are only summarized in this article to provide context for the gender
findings; we anticipate providing a full exploration of these data in a
separate article or forum.
We then scrutinized the data and general analyses in light of the
Supreme Court’s gender composition at the time of the decision. These
analyses were designed to focus on the impact of female Justices on the
Court’s holdings in securities cases. We evaluated both individual Justice
voting patterns, as well as potential panel effects. In addition, we
performed a separate substantive review of certain cases in the database
that presented striking, but not necessarily statistically significant, results in
our quantitative analyses. The results of our various analyses in the gender
context are set forth in detail below.
III. DATA REPORT AND ANALYSIS
In seeking to identify and analyze any gender impact on securities cases
decided by the Supreme Court, our basic hypothesis was that the presence
of one or more female Justices on the Court would not significantly affect
the outcome of the cases. We based this hypothesis on the majority of
judicial voting studies showing gender impact almost exclusively in the
context of cases involving traditional feminist issues.77 The data tend to
prove our hypothesis.
Securities cases typically do not raise gender sensitive or traditionally
feminist issues. Female Justices likely have similar experiences to their
male colleagues with securities law issues; additionally, most cases do not
involve a particular issue unique to gender that warrants special
consideration or to which female Justices bring gender-specific expertise or
knowledge. Consequently, our findings also garner support under the
various theories of gender and voting discussed in Part II.A.78
Perhaps just as important are the study’s secondary findings that
suggest several intriguing associations and trends in securities cases
involving female Justices. For example, all five female-authored majority
opinions involving alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
remand at least one issue to the lower court, and focus more on serving
legislative intent than showing a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias.79
Moreover, all-male panels were marginally more likely to decline to
impose sanctions than panels including at least one female Justice, which
were marginally more likely to leave open the possibility for sanctions.80

77
78
79
80

See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part IV.D.1.f.
See infra Part IV.D.1.
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The Court also was more likely to decide a case by a unanimous decision
when at least one female Justice was present on the panel.81
We believe these data support meaningful inferences that may provide a
foundation for further study. Specifically, the presence of a female Justice
may change the dynamics of deliberations and facilitate collaborative
decisions. Although studies debate whether females in the corporate
boardroom impact firm financial performance, several commentators
emphasize the cultural and other non-outcome related value to having
female group members.82 Our study suggests that such intangible value
may exist, not only in the boardroom, but also in the courtroom.83
This section first presents basic descriptive and background data that
identify the attributes of the eighty-eight cases included in the database.
The data suggest significant findings with respect to the presence of amicus
briefs in the case. These findings appear driven primarily by the amicus
filings themselves, and not by the gender of the Justices. Nevertheless, we
provide some of the key data for context and potential further study. The
section then delves into the gender-specific data. It presents both the
overall findings, as well as discrete analyses performed on specific gender
data. The section concludes by synthesizing the gender data and
suggesting opportunities for future studies.
A. Background Data Analysis
1. Variables of Interest in Database
We first examined the frequencies of the variables of interest to make
sure we had adequate variation to perform the analyses. For example, we
investigated the legal issue before the U.S. Supreme Court. In order of
frequency, the legal issues from the eighty-eight case opinions were: the
81

See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-71. See also Diana Bilimoria, Building the Business Case for Women
Corporate Directors, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 25, 27 (Ronald J. Burke & Mary C. Mattis eds., 2000) (referencing
studies that posit female board members “generate a more productive discourse around the board
table. . . .”); Zena Burgess & Phyllis Tharenou, Women Board Directors: Characteristics of the Few, 37
J. BUS. ETHICS 39, 40 (2002) (explaining reasons often offered for including women on boards of
directors, including their “influence on decision making and leadership styles of the organization” and
“ensuring ‘better’ board-room behavior”); KRAMER ET AL., supra note 68 (study finding that women in
the boardroom “bring a collaborative leadership style that benefits boardroom dynamics.”). But see
Does Critical Mass Matter? supra note 70, at 1080 (urging skepticism towards studies suggesting
different outcomes based on a critical mass theory because “[a]lthough increased minority
representation could enhance opportunities for collaboration and support . . . other scenarios are also
plausible.”).
83
See also Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Feminine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State
Supreme Court, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 295, 315 (2000-01) (finding in a study of Minnesota Supreme
Court that, “[a]lthough the level of consensus for the court as a whole increased as more women were
placed on the bench, the female justices also began to dissent more frequently.”).
82
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Exchange Act (forty-five, 51.1%); both the Exchange Act and Securities
Act (eleven, 12.5%); other (eleven, 12.5%); the 1940 Investment Company
Act (six, 6.8%); the Securities Act (five, 5.7%); the Exchange Act and
other (four, 4.5%); the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and the 1940 Act
(two, 2.3%); state securities laws (two, 2.3%); the 1940 Act and other (one,
1.1%); and a state securities law and other (one, 1.1%).
We then examined the case holdings. The Court found for the
petitioner in fifty-three (60.2%) cases, the respondent in thirty-two
(36.4%), neither in two (2.3%), and both (in some manner) in one (1.1%)
of the opinions. Looking to what the Court held, the Court declined to
impose sanctions or liability under the securities laws in forty (45.5%) of
the opinions, left open the possibility of some type of sanction or liability
in thirty (34.1%) of the opinions, did not discuss sanctions or liability in
eleven (12.5%) of the opinions, imposed monetary sanctions in four (4.5%)
of the opinions, and imposed other liability or non-monetary sanctions in
three (3.4%) of the opinions. With respect to the Court’s treatment of the
lower court’s decision, the Court affirmed in thirty (34.1%); reversed in
twenty-three (26.1%); reversed and remanded in twenty (22.7%); vacated
in four (4.5%); vacated and remanded in three (3.4%); affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded in three (4.5%); and remanded in two
(2.3%) of the opinions — in one opinion, the Court affirmed in part and
remanded, and, in another opinion, the Court reversed in part and
remanded.
Additionally, we investigated the amicus curiae briefs. Of the eightyeight case opinions, twenty-two (25.0%) did not have an amicus brief filed
for either party, thirty (34.1%) had an amicus brief for one of the parties,
and thirty-six (40.9%) had amicus briefs filed for both parties. Of the thirty
case opinions with an amicus brief for only one of the parties, the brief was
filed for the petitioner in twelve of the case opinions and for the respondent
in eighteen of the case opinions.
We then further investigated the parties in the case, specifically whether
the Court ultimately finds more often for the original petitioner or
respondent. In a cross tabs analysis of for whom the Court found, and
which party was the defendant in the lower court action, we found that the
Court finds for the defendant in fifty-four of the opinions and for the
plaintiff in thirty-one of the opinions. This is almost perfectly reversed
from the Court’s finding for the petitioner in fifty-three opinions and for
the respondent in thirty-two of the opinions. It may indicate an association
between the party identity of petitioners in the U.S. Supreme Court and
defendants in the related lower court action. As discussed infra Part
IV.B.2, the data suggest that, when the Court holds in favor of a corporate
petitioner, that corporation likely was the defendant in the lower court
action.
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2. The Role of Legal Issue
With the above frequencies in mind, we then investigated whether the
legal issue before the Court affected the Court’s ultimate holding (e.g., for
whom the Court found, what the Court found, and how the Court treated
the lower court’s decision). Regarding for whom the Court found, the legal
issue did not make a significant difference.84 The Court found for the
petitioner in 60.2% of the cases, and found for the petitioner in 60% of the
forty-five Exchange Act cases, which comprised more than half of the
sample, after the three cases were removed where the Court found for both
or neither party. One interesting finding is that cases involving both the
Securities Act and Exchange Act were disproportionately more likely to
result in a holding for the petitioner (80.0% do, as compared to 60.2% of
the overall sample, 60.0% for the Exchange Act alone and 60.0% for the
Securities Act alone).85
Overall, the legal issue before the Court did not affect whether the
Court imposed or declined to impose sanctions.86 Cases involving the
Exchange Act did not differ significantly from the overall case set:87 the
Court declined to impose sanctions or liability under securities laws in
46.7% (45.5% overall), left open the possibility of some type of sanction or
liability in 31.1% (34.1% overall), did not discuss sanctions or liability in
15.6% (12.5% overall), imposed monetary sanctions in 6.6% (4.5%
overall), and imposed other liability or non-monetary sanctions in none
(3.4% overall). Cases involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts are
more likely to result in the Court leaving open the possibility of sanctions
(in 45.5% of cases, as compared to 34.1% overall, 31.1% for the Exchange
Act alone and 40.0% for the Securities Act alone). All four of the cases
where the Court imposed monetary sanctions involved the Exchange Act,
while all three of the cases resulting in the imposition of other nonmonetary sanctions involved the Securities Act. The sample size for these
findings is too small to draw initial conclusions, but each finding warrants
further research to examine the role of the legal issue on imposition of
sanctions.
To further examine the unique role of cases involving both the
Securities and Exchange Acts, we then explored whether the Court treated
their lower court decisions differently. Results found that the Court did;
cases involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts were those most
likely to be reversed (in 54.5% of these cases, as compared to 26.4% of the
overall cases, 25.0% of the Exchange Act cases, and 20.0% of the
84
X 2 (27) = 11.29, p = .997; the result remains non-significant, X2(27) = 4.21, p = .887, even after
removing the three cases where the Court found for both or neither party.
85
See id.
86
X 2 (36) = 43.39, p = .185.
87
See id.
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Securities Act cases). There were no other significant trends when
comparing the treatment of lower court decision and the raised legal issue.
Overall, it appears that when the Court was provided a complex case
involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts, the Court was more
likely to find for the petitioner, leaving open the possibility of sanctions
(but not imposing them), and/or reversing the lower court’s decision.
3. The Role of Amicus Briefs
We then explored whether the presence of amicus briefs affected the
Court’s holding. This analysis consisted of three parts: the role of amicus
briefs overall and then the role of petitioner and respondent amicus briefs.
Overall, when an amicus brief was filed in the case, the Court was
significantly more likely to find for the respondent.88 In particular, the
Court found for the respondent in 44.4% (twenty-eight of sixty-three) of
the cases where an amicus brief for either party was filed, while the Court
found for the petitioner in 18.2% (four of twenty-two) of the cases when no
amicus brief was filed for either party. The presence of an amicus brief
(for either party) mitigated the Court’s general trends discussed supra Part
IV.A.1 to find in favor of petitioners. This effect, however, focused on
only whether any amicus brief was filed, not on which party was supported.
The Court declined to impose sanctions in 40.9% of cases (twentyseven of sixty-six) when an amicus brief was filed for either party and
declined to impose sanctions in 59.1% of cases (thirteen of twenty-two)
with no amicus brief. However, no significant effect emerged when
examining whether the presence of an amicus brief affected our composite
variable concerning the Court’s decision to impose sanctions and, if
relevant, what type of sanctions were imposed.89 The presence of an
amicus brief likewise had no effect on how the Court treated the lower
court’s decision.90 Accordingly, the primary impact of amicus briefs in the
analysis so far is the finding that the Court was more likely to hold in favor
of the respondent when an amicus brief is filed.
From this set of findings, one would assume that the majority of amicus
briefs in this analysis were filed in support of the respondent. As expected,
when there was an amicus brief filed for the respondent (in 46.2% of cases,
twenty-four of fifty-two), the Court was significantly more likely to find
for the respondent, as compared to cases where no amicus brief for the
respondent was filed (in 24.2% of cases, eight of thirty-three).91 While the
filing of an amicus brief for the respondent generally improved the
likelihood that the Court would find for the respondent, the Court was still
88
89
90
91

X 2 (1) = 4.79, p < .05.
X 2 (4) = 5.24, p = .26.
X 2 (8) = 6.37, p = .61.
X 2 (1) = 4.13, p < .05.
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more likely to find for the petitioner. In addition, the presence of an
amicus brief for the respondent did not affect whether sanctions were
imposed,92 or how the Court treated the lower court’s opinion.93
Surprisingly, the presence of an amicus brief for the petitioner did not
affect for whom the Court held.94 For example, the Court found for the
petitioner in 65.8% (twenty-five of thirty-eight) of the cases without a
petitioner amicus brief and found for the petitioner in 59.6% (twenty-eight
of forty-seven) of the cases with a petitioner amicus brief. While these
findings were statistically non-significant, they represent the opposite of
what is to be expected. As with the respondent briefs, a petitioner amicus
brief did not affect sanctions liability,95 or how the Court treated the lower
court’s opinion.96
4. Changes Over Time Concerning Amicus Briefs
We then sought to explore whether the presence of amicus briefs has
changed over time. Again, our stratified sample included cases from 1971
until 2010 to effectively gauge the effect of adding female Justices to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Throughout this period, the presence of amicus briefs
increased in general.97 The likelihood that a case would have an amicus
brief for the petitioner also significantly increased,98 however, there was
only a marginally significant increase in the likelihood that the case would
have an amicus brief for the respondent.99 This is especially interesting
given the above finding that respondent amicus briefs had a significantly
stronger effect on Court holdings than petitioner amicus briefs.
We then examined if cases were more likely to have amicus curiae
briefs, over time, before the appointment of the first female Justice. Before
the appointment of the first female Justice, cases were already receiving
increasingly more amicus briefs filed for the petitioner,100 overall,101 but
not for the respondent.102 This matches the trend that continued when
female Justices were added to the Court. Thus, it appears that it is the
effect of time, and not the addition of female Justices, which led to the
increase of amicus curiae briefs. Additionally, the party for which the
Court held did not significantly change over time.103
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

X 2 (4) = 7.00, p = .14.
X 2 (8) = 6.15, p = .63.
X 2 (1) = 0.35, p = .56.
X 2 (4) = 0.64, p = .96.
X 2 (8) = 4.86, p = .77.
F (35, 87) = 1.83, p < .05.
F (35, 87) = 1.76, p < .05.
F (35, 87) = 1.56, p = .07.
p < .05.
p < .05.
p = .08.
F (35, 84) = 1.04, p = .44.
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B. The Role of Female Justices
Our research sought to investigate whether the presence of one or more
female Justices on the Court affected decisions in securities cases. The
results presented below will analyze the differences between the all-male
Court and the Court after the addition of female Justices, as well as the
differences among the various female compositions on the Court. In
addition, Appendix B presents regression analyses showing the predictive
effect, if any, of the variables of interest coded in the database. Overall, the
regression results showed that there is no overall effect for gender across
the entire case sample. However, when evaluating the cases after the
addition of female Justices, whether a female Justice authored the majority
opinion significantly predicted what the Court held.104
In the eighty-eight cases examined, twenty different Justices
participated in the opinions and each was provided with his or her own
code. When examining the majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents,
there were ninety-two different combinations of Justices, each provided
with its own code. We then split the variables into those including female
Justices and those without female Justices. Of the eighty-eight cases
examined for this study, forty-nine of the opinions were issued by all malepanels and thirty-nine of the opinions were issued by the Court when one or
more female Justice was involved.
1. The Panel Effect of Female Justices
This initial set of analyses did not consider the role female Justices
played (i.e., were they in the majority, concurrence, dissent, split amongst
themselves) but, rather, looked to differences in the study variables
between the all-male and female-included panels.
Primary Finding: Female-Included Panels Do Not Differ Significantly
from All-Male Panels in Types of Claims or Decision Outcomes
First, we wanted to determine if the female-included panels faced
different types of claims or different types of claimants than the exclusively
male panels. Neither the type of petitioners nor type of respondents
differed between the panels. For example, both panels had nineteen cases
each with individual respondents and four cases each with institutional
investors, while the male-only panels had eighteen corporations as
respondents (female-included panels had twelve) and eight governmental
respondents (female-included panels had four).105 The issues presented
also did not significantly differ between the female-included and all-male
104

See infra Appendix B.
X2 (3) = 1.42, p = .70. Additionally, the parties did not “switch sides” in a differential manner
between the two types of panels. When examining whether the petitioners or respondents were
originally petitioners or respondents at the trial court level, there was no significant difference (p = .11).
105
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panels.106 For both panels, the majority of cases involved the Exchange
Act (51% of both the all-male and female-included panels), and a similar
few involved the Securities Act (discussed in 20% of the all-male and 21%
of the female-included panels’ opinions). Other issues, such as the 1940
Investment Company Act and state securities laws, were rare in the sample.
Because eighty-six of the eighty-eight cases (98%) came from federal
courts, we did not analyze any difference between cases which did or did
not come from a federal court.
Second, decision outcomes also did not differ between the all-male and
female-included panels. Panel composition did not meaningfully influence
whether the Court found for the respondent (thirty (61%) for the all-male as
compared to twenty-three (59%) of the female-included) or petitioner (in
sixteen in each of the all-male and female-included panels, 33% and 41%
respectively).107
Secondary Trend: Female-Included Panels Less Likely than All-Male
Panels to Show Pro-corporate Bias
A simple analysis of whether the Court held for the petitioner or
respondent does not consider the type of party potentially benefitting from
the Court’s holding or that party’s likely position before the Court. To
explore these factors, we re-coded the type of petitioner and respondent so
we could further examine when the Court held for a corporation or held
against a corporation when only one party was a corporation. We excluded
cases where both parties were corporations or where neither was a
corporation because each would require the Court to hold for or against a
corporation, unless it found for neither or both. The all-male panel found
for a corporation in eighteen (69%) of these selected cases and against a
corporation in eight (31%). The female-included panel found for a
corporation in fourteen (58%) of these selected cases and against a
corporation in ten (42%).108 We then examined whether the corporation’s
original status as plaintiff or defendant affected the Court’s decision.
We first examined the all-male panels, looking only at the corporate
parties. When the Court found for the corporate petitioner, the corporation
was the defendant in the lower court action in every case. When the Court
found for the corporate respondent, the corporation was the defendant in
66% of the cases (and plaintiff in 33% of the cases). This shows a strong
trend of the Court finding for corporations when they are originally
defendants, the party sued under the securities laws.
In the female-included panels, when the Court found for the petitioner
corporation, the corporation was originally the defendant in 77% of the
106
X2 (9) = 6.74, p = .67. For example, coders identified whether cases involved the 1933 Securities
Act, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the 1940 Investment Company Act, or stated securities laws.
107
The remainder of the holdings either found for both parties or neither party.
108
There was not a significant difference in either this limited sample or the entire sample, with the
other cases coded “both corporations” or “neither corporation.”
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cases, and the plaintiff in 23% of the cases. When the Court found for the
respondent corporation, the corporation was originally the defendant in
57% of the cases and the plaintiff in 43% of the cases. Although some
studies suggest an increasing pro-business bias on the Court, our data
suggest that this trend, at least measured by the identity of the party, is not
as prominent in the securities context.
Secondary Trend: Female-Included Panels Less Likely than All-Male
Panels to Decline Imposition of Sanctions
While the panels did not significantly differ in whether they imposed
sanctions,109 the all-male panels were marginally more likely to decline to
impose sanctions and the female-included panels were marginally more
likely to leave open the possibility for sanctions. Very few of the holdings
in either panel imposed any type of monetary or nonmonetary sanctions.110
Although related more to changes over time than gender composition,
the female-included panels were significantly more likely to have cases
with an amicus curiae brief for the petitioner (in 72% of cases, as compared
to 59% for the all-male panels),111 and more likely to have cases with an
amicus curiae brief for the respondent (in 74% of cases, as compared to
49% for the all-male panels).112 The female-included panels were also
significantly more likely to have amicus curiae briefs filed for both
respondent and petitioner, as seen in Figure 1.113 Overall, 85% of opinions
with a female in the majority included at least one amicus curiae brief, as
compared to 67% of all-male majority opinions.

109
X2 (4) = 7.18, p = .13. Post-hoc analyses found that the all-male Court declined to impose
sanctions in 53% of their cases, while the female-included Court declined to impose sanctions in 43%
of their cases. Interestingly, the female-included Court left open the possibility of sanctions in 44% of
their cases, while the all-male Court left open the possibility in 27%.
110
The all-male Court imposed monetary sanctions in one case and nonmonetary sanctions in three,
while the female-included Court imposed monetary sanctions in three cases, but never nonmonetary
sanctions.
111
X2 (1) = 8.41, p < .01.
112
X2 (1) = 4.99, p < .05.
113
X2 (2) = 9.04, p < .05.
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All male
20
15

Female

10
5
0
No AC

1 AC

Both have
AC

Figure 1. Use of amicus curiae (AC) by all-male or female-included
majority opinions.
Thus, it does not appear that there were any significant differences
in outcomes between the all-male and female-included panels as a whole,
but there were differences in favoring corporations and the possibility of
sanctions. Additionally, as stated supra, the significant effects of amicus
curiae briefs may not have any relationship to the gender composition of
the Court but, rather, could be a result of the overall increase of such briefs
over time.
2. The Effect of Individual Justices
But what about the voting patterns of the individual female Justices
themselves? Could there be significant differences in voting behavior
based upon whether the female-included Court involved only Justice
O’Connor, both Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg, solely Justice Ginsburg,
or both Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor? Table 1 displays the frequencies
of each female Justice combination in the sample.
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Frequency
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Percentage

All male Court

49

55.7

O’Connor

22

25.0

O’Connor and Ginsburg

9

10.2

Ginsburg

5

5.7

Ginsburg and Sotomayor

3

3.4

Total

88

100.0

Table 1. Distribution of Female Justices Across Sample
In the thirty-nine cases with females on the bench, at least one
female Justice was in the majority opinion for thirty-five of the cases. In
the remaining four cases, O’Connor did not participate in one, O’Connor
concurred in part and dissented in part for one, Ginsburg dissented in one,
and Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented together in one. Additionally, at
least one female Justice was in the dissent for eight of the thirty-nine cases:
O’Connor was in the dissent in three, O’Connor concurred in part and
dissented in part for one, O’Connor was in the majority and Ginsburg
dissented in one, O’Connor was in the majority and Ginsburg concurred in
part and dissented in part in one, Ginsburg dissented in one, and Ginsburg
and Sotomayor dissented in one.
Of the thirty-nine female-included panels, only twelve included
more than one female Justice. While Justice Sotomayor is still relatively
new to the bench and there were only three cases in our sample with her on
the panel, it is interesting to note that the rate of agreement between
Ginsburg and Sotomayor is at 100.0%, whereas it was at 55.6% between
Ginsburg and O’Connor, who were on nine panels in the sample. See
Table 2.
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Female Justices
O’Connor and Ginsburg

Ginsburg and Sotomayor

25

Agree in
Agree in
Disagree
Majority
Dissent
5
0
4
(55.6%)
(0%)
(44.4%)
Overall Agreement: 55.6%
2
1
0
(66.6%)
(33.3%)
(0%)
Overall Agreement: 100%

Table 2. Agreement Among Female Justices Across Sample
We then explored potential case differences between the all-male,
O’Connor-only, O’Connor and Ginsburg, Ginsburg-only, and Ginsburg and
Sotomayor panels (referred to as “Justice-specific panels”). The Justicespecific panels differed on type of petitioner,114 although this is likely
because the government was a petitioner only in the all-male and O’Connor
and Ginsburg panels. The panels did not differ based upon type of
respondent,115 but it is interesting to note that in all three of the cases with
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, the petitioner was a corporation. The respondent
in these three cases was either an institutional investor or the U.S.
government. The Exchange Act was the most common legal issue
presented for every Justice-specific panel, except for the panels with
Ginsburg and Sotomayor. The Exchange Act was considered in 71% of the
cases overall, but in only one of the three Ginsburg-Sotomayor cases.
The Justice-specific panel’s opinions also differed based upon the
presence of amicus curiae for the petitioner116 and respondent.117 As
described supra in Part IV.C.4, cases brought to the all-male Court
included amicus curiae for the petitioner 41% of the time, as compared to
at least 68% of the time for the female-included panels, including in 100%
(three for three) of the Ginsburg and Sotomayor cases. Again, this is very
likely due to changes over time rather than gender composition.
Looking to the holdings of the securities cases, the Court was more
likely to hold for the petitioner in every Justice-specific panel, except for
the O’Connor-only and the Ginsburg and Sotomayor panels. The Court
found for the petitioner 61% of the time for the all-male panel, 78% of the
time for the O’Connor and Ginsburg panel, and 80% of the time for the
114
X2 (12) = 19.20, p = .08. Post-hoc analyses found significant differences based upon the number
of government petitioners, as described in the text.
115
X2 (12) = 7.39, p = .83.
116
X2 (4) = 9.72, p < .05.
117
X2 (4) = 9.80, p < .05.
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Ginsburg-only panel, but found for the petitioner 50% of the time for the
O’Connor-only panel and 33% of the time (just one of three) in the
Ginsburg and Sotomayor panel.
Secondary Trend: Change in Pro-Corporate Bias Occurred upon
Appointment of Justice O’Connor and Not Gradually; Potential for
Influence of Confounding Factors
When examining whether the Court found for or against a
corporation, we again examined how many of the parties (both, one, or
neither) were corporations. Looking solely to when one of the parties was
a corporation and the other was not, all of the Justice-specific panels were
more likely to find in favor of the corporate party, except when Justice
O’Connor was the only female. See Table 3. Combined, it appears that the
Court with O’Connor as the only female Justice was least likely, compared
to the other Justice-specific panels, to hold in favor of either the corporate
party, or the petitioner.
As stated supra, the all-male panels had a stronger pro-corporate
bias; every time the Court found for a petitioner corporation, the
corporation was the defendant in the lower court action. This additional
analysis shows that the reduction in a potential pro-corporate bias started
almost immediately after the addition of Justice O’Connor to the Court,
rather than gradually over time with the addition of female Justices. We
were not able to isolate gender as having a significant effect on any procorporate bias in the Court. As such, factors such as the ideology of the
Justices, the economic and regulatory environment at the time of the
decision, and similar factors may have influenced this trend.118 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the Court is showing increased interest in corporate
and securities cases even as the Court has reduced the number of decisions
it renders each term, and at least one study suggests that the Court is
returning to a pro-corporate trend.119

118
For an acknowledgement of the potential role of ideology in securities cases, see infra note 145
and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Shannon Green, Review of 2011 Securities Litigation Forecasts for 2012 and Beyond,
LAW.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202542022439 (noting
that “in 2010 and 2011 . . . there’s been an unusual level of activity from the U.S. Supreme Court in
securities cases”); Lee Epstein et al., Is the Robert Court Pro-Business?, UNIV. OF S. CAL. (Dec. 17,
2010), http://epstein.usc.edu/research/RobertsBusiness.pdf.
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Justices

27

For
Corporation

Against
Corporation

All male Court

18

8

O’Connor

7

7

O’Connor and Ginsburg

3

1

Ginsburg

2

1

Ginsburg and Sotomayor

2

1

Total

32

18

Table 3. Corporate Bias Across Justice-specific Panels
Secondary Trend: Potential for Female-Included Panels to Decline
Imposition of Sanctions Increased Over Time
The Justice-specific panels did not significantly differ in their
dispositions of cases (i.e., affirmed, reversed, remanded)120 or whether or
not they imposed sanctions121, but an interesting trend emerged with
refusals to impose sanctions. While the all-male panels declined to impose
sanctions in 53% of cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 27%
of cases, this ratio continued to erode over time. Both the O’Connor, and
the O’Connor and Ginsburg panels either declined to impose sanctions or
left open the possibility of sanctions in an equal number of cases (36% each
for the O’Connor cases and 44% each for the O’Connor and Ginsburg
cases). Then, post-O’Connor, the cases with Ginsburg as the only female
Justice left open the possibility of sanctions in 60% of cases and declined to
impose sanctions in the remaining 40%, while the Ginsburg-Sotomayorincluded cases left open the possibility of sanctions in 66% of the cases and
did not discuss sanctions in the third case. See Figure 2. It appears that
Justices, over time, were less likely to decline to impose sanctions and
more likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions.

120

X2 (32) = 42.32, p = .11.
X2 (16) = 14.12, p = .59. As noted earlier, however, female-included panels were marginally more
likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions.
121
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All male
30

O'Connor

25

O'Connor/ Ginsburg

20

Ginsburg

15

Ginsburg/Sotomayor

10
5
0
Left Open

Declined

Other

Figure 2. The rate of imposing sanctions by Justice-specific panels.

a. Female-Included Majority Opinions
While there were some interesting trends across the different
Justice-specific panels, the gender composition of the Court panels was not
the cause of such significant differences. Of the thirty-nine femaleincluded panels, a female Justice was in the majority opinion for thirty-five
of the cases. This initially supposes that women are either prone to agree
with the majority or work as unifiers, bringing the Justices together into a
majority opinion.
Because of the paucity of cases where women were on the Court
but not in the majority opinion, statistical analyses were unlikely to define
variability between cases with and without female-included majority
opinions. As expected, no significant differences emerged. Still, we
decided to examine both the thirty-five cases with female-included majority
opinions and three female-included cases with women in the dissent and/or
concurrence, but not in the majority.122 Future research might expand the

122

Note that this excludes the one case where Justice O’Connor did not take part in the judgment.
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scope to include more cases and a greater variety of cases, in order to
broaden the sample of cases where a female Justice is involved in the
decision, but is not a member of the majority.
Cases with a female joining the majority opinion and cases with an
all-male panel were equally likely to find for the petitioner or
respondent,123 with a slight bias toward the petitioner, and equally likely to
hold for a corporation.124 The three groups (female in majority, all male,
and female in concurrence or dissent) did not differ in the issues presented,
as all three were significantly more likely to involve the Exchange Act.125
These three groups significantly differed, however, in imposition
of sanctions, as discussed above regarding all-male versus female-included
panels.126 The all-male panels declined to impose sanctions in 53% of
cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 27% of cases, while the
cases with a female in the majority declined to impose sanctions in 34% of
cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 49% of cases. In the
three cases where female Justices joined either the concurrence or dissent,
one Court imposed monetary sanctions, one declined to impose, and
sanctions were not discussed in the third. None of the three left the
sanction issue open.
The split of the Court was significantly different among the three
groups.127 All three groups significantly differed from each other at the p <
.05 level. Post-hoc analyses found that the Court split 5-4 in all three of the
cases where a female Justice took part in the decision but did not join the
majority. There was a 5-4 split in only 11% of the cases with a female
Justice in the majority and only 18% of the all-male cases. Additionally,
40% of the cases with at least one female Justice in the majority had a
unanimous decision, compared to zero of the cases with a female taking
part in the decision but not joining the majority and 16% of the all-male
cases.128
The findings that 5-4 decisions versus unanimous decisions were
dependent on whether a female Justice voted with the majority are striking.
They support an inference that female Justices bring a different approach
123

X2 (6) = 2.51, p = .87.
X2 (6) = 2.90, p = .82.
125
In 70% of the all-male cases, 71% of the female in majority cases, and 66% (two of three) of the
female in concurrence or dissent cases. Resulting statistical analyses found these differences to not be
statistically different.
126
X2 (8) = 15.65, p < .05.
127
F (2, 87) = 5.75, p < .01.
128
The significant percentage (40%) of cases with at least one female Justice in the majority that
reached a unanimous verdict may suggest that a female presence and/or voice contributed to a greater
collaborative effort. In contrast, there seems to have been more difficulty in reaching a consensus with
an all-male bench, where only 16% of cases yielded a unanimous verdict.
124
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both to the bench and deliberations concerning decisions. This type of
inference corresponds with gender studies that suggest that women are
more collaborative in their negotiations and decision-making, and that they
work to build consensus.129 We were not able, however, to isolate an effect
so this inference, like many generalizations, should be noted with caution
and explored more deeply.

b. Female-Authored Majority Opinions
Women were part of thirty-five of the thirty-nine majority
opinions, but authored only five of those thirty-five opinions. While a
significant difference emerged for type of petitioner held for,130 this effect
was solely due to the low number of female-authored opinions. For
instance, in the male-authored majority opinions, petitioners were split
among seventeen (49%) individual petitioners, fifteen (43%) corporation
petitioners, two (6%) institutional investors, and one (3%) government
party. For the female-authored majority opinions, two (40%) involved a
government petitioner, while an individual, an institutional investor, and a
corporation each comprised one petitioner (20% each).
As with the female-included majority opinions, we also chose to
determine if any differences existed between the five female-authored and
thirty-five male-authored majority opinions. Though not significant, it is
interesting to note that four of the five female-authored opinions had
individuals as respondents; four had amicus curiae for the petitioner and
three had amicus curiae for the respondent.
For female-authored majority opinions, the final court decision was
about evenly split (the Court found for the petitioner in three (60%) and for
the respondent in two (40%)). Three of the decisions (60%) left open the
possibility of sanctions, while one (20%) imposed monetary sanctions and
one (60%) declined to impose sanctions. The type of holding, however, did
produce a significant effect, as four female-authored opinions (80%)
reversed and remanded and one (20%) affirmed in part and remanded.131
While only a small number of opinions were examined, it is intriguing that
they clustered around a single holding, such as a reversal. Additional
research using a stratified sampling method to more equally compare
female-authored and male-authored opinions is necessary to further explain
this result.

129
130
131

See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
X2 (3) = 10.60, p < .05.
X2 (6) = 15.62, p < .05.
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Nevertheless, we were intrigued by these trends and decided to
examine these five female-authored majority opinions more closely to
determine whether any qualitative associations existed. All five cases
involved at least one alleged violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.132 As noted above, they all also remand at least one issue to the lower
court. Justice O’Connor authored three of the decisions and Justice
Ginsburg authored two of the decisions. Although each decision
recognizes the importance of the anti-fraud objectives of the securities
laws, two of the decisions, Tellabs (written by Ginsburg) and Shearson
(written by O’Connor), focused on the provisions of other applicable laws
to rule in favor of the original defendants on the particular issue in the
securities cases.133 McMahon upholds the validity of an agreement to
arbitrate a Rule 10b-5 claim, and, of course, once the claim is in arbitration,
the claimant may prevail.134 Likewise, two of the decisions, O’Hagan
(written by Ginsburg) and Edwards (written by O’Connor), interpret
federal securities laws in a way that broadens the behavior to which those
laws extend.135 At least in these five decisions, the approaches of Ginsburg
and O’Connor in securities cases appear similar. Interestingly, differences
do emerge between Ginsburg and O’Connor in other securities cases. As
discussed infra, these differences may relate more to ideology, however,
than to a female perspective on business or securities cases.136

c. Female-Included Concurrences
Overall, forty-eight (43.2%) of the cases examined included a
concurrence. The number of Justices taking part in the concurrence
included one (eighteen cases), two (five cases), three (ten cases), four
(three cases), and five (two cases). Of the forty-eight cases with a

132

See Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389
(2004); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
133
See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (interpreting the “strong inference” standard under § 21D(b)(2) of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)); see also Shearson, 482 U.S. at 225-26 (deferring to the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), mandating enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims).
134
See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
135
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 659 (applying the misappropriation theory to find that the
defendant’s trading on misappropriated information was a violation of § 10(b)); see also Edwards, 540
U.S. at 396-97 (finding that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return is subject to federal
securities laws because the scheme fell within the definition of an investment contract).
136
See infra Part IV.B.2(f).
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concurrence, five included a female Justice. Of those five cases, a female
Justice was the sole author of none of the concurrences.137

d. Female-Included Dissents
Fifty one (58%) of the cases in which female Justices participated
included a dissent. The number of Justices included in the dissent were one
(fifteen cases), two (five cases), three (sixteen cases), and four (fifteen
cases). Female Justices participated in eight dissents.
We then attempted to identify any differences between all-male
and female-included dissents. Of the eighty-eight opinions, eight included
dissents involving female Justices. Again, the low number affects the
ability to perform analyses.
However, significant differences still
emerged.138 Female-included dissents were significantly more likely to
include an amicus curiae brief for the petitioner (in 51% of the all-male
dissents versus 88% of the female-included dissents),139 but not for the
respondent.140 Interestingly, while male-only dissents were more evenly
split among cases with no amicus curiae briefs (26%), one amicus curiae
brief (38%), and both with amicus curiae briefs (36%), female-included
dissents either did not include an amicus curiae brief (13%) or included an
amicus curiae brief for both parties (88%).141 No other significant
differences emerged.

e. Female-Authored Dissents
Female Justices co-authored three of the eight dissents, but were the
sole author of no dissents in the sample. There were no significant
differences between the three female-authored dissents and the thirty-seven
male-authored dissents. Interestingly, but not significantly due to the low
number of female-authored dissents, all three female-authored dissents
included amicus curiae for both the respondent (73% for the male-authored
dissents) and the petitioner (70% for the male-authored dissents), and all
See also Maule, supra note 83, at 315 (“Concurrences were rarely used as a vehicle by the female
justices on the Minnesota State Supreme Court to express any voice, let alone a different voice. Female
justices, on the whole, either agreed with both the outcome of and the legal reasoning behind a decision
or they disagreed with the decision altogether.”).
138
A significant difference emerged regarding the type of petitioner (X2 (3) = 9.27, p < .05).
However, this is likely due to the small number of dissents with female Justices. For example, while an
institutional investor was the petitioner in two of the all-male and two of the female-included dissents,
their percentage, as compared to the overall cases, is 2.5% and 25.0%.
139
X2 (1) = 3.86, p < .05.
140
X2 (1) = 2.54, p = .11.
141
X2 (2) = 8.22, p < .05.
137
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three female-authored dissents found for the petitioner (54% for the maleauthored dissents).
For the three female-authored dissents, two (67%) had a
corporation as a petitioner and an individual respondent, and one (33%)
had an individual petitioner and a corporation as the respondent. Again,
while this differs from the male-authored dissents where fourteen (38%) of
cases had corporations as petitioners and seventeen (46%) had individual
petitioners, eighteen (49%) of the cases had individual respondents and
twelve (32%) had corporations as respondents.

f. Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg
We then explored the five cases with O’Connor and Ginsburg in
the majority, as well as the three cases with O’Connor in the majority and
Ginsburg in the dissent, in order to obtain a more descriptive understanding
of these cases. Interestingly, there were no cases with Ginsburg in the
majority and O’Connor in the dissent.
For the five cases with both O’Connor and Ginsburg in the
majority, the petitioner was either a corporation (two) or the government
(three), and the respondent was an individual (four) or a corporation (one).
The Court held for the petitioner corporation in two of the cases and, in
both cases, the corporation was originally the defendant. The Court held
for the government as a petitioner in two cases. The Court held for the
individual respondent (who was originally the plaintiff) in one of the cases.
The cases generally focused on the Exchange Act (three), with one
involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts, and one involving the
Exchange Act and a separate issue. The majority opinions left open the
possibility of sanctions in three of the cases, imposed monetary sanctions in
one and declined to impose sanctions in one. The court affirmed in one of
the opinions, reversed in one of the opinions, and reversed and remanded in
three of the opinions. Surprisingly, all five of the opinions with both
O’Connor and Ginsburg in the majority were unanimous opinions, though
one case also had a concur-in-part/dissent-in-part opinion in which three
Justices joined.
For the three cases with O’Connor in the majority and Ginsburg in
the dissent, the petitioner was either an individual (two) or institutional
investor (one), and the respondent was either a corporation (two) or
institutional investor/business entity (one).142 The Court found for the

142

Two of the cases involved the Exchange Act and one involved the Securities Act. The Court
majority declined to impose sanctions in all three cases. The Court affirmed in one of the opinions,
reversed in one of the opinions, and reversed and remanded in one of the opinions. One was a 7-2
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petitioner in two of the opinions, but all three of the majority opinions
limited the protections of the securities laws. For example, in Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., the Court held that Section 12(2) of the Securities Act does not
extend to private sale contracts;143 in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the
Court held Section 27(A)(b) of the Exchange Act, permitting reinstatement
of certain actions previously dismissed as time barred, to be
unconstitutional, preventing the original plaintiffs from pursuing their
securities law claims against the original defendant;144 and in Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court held that a private
party may not bring an aiding and abetting lawsuit under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act.145 Moreover, in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Gustafson—where ideologically liberal Justice Breyer and ideologically
conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia also dissented—and in Justice
Steven’s dissent, joined by Ginsburg, in Plaut, both Justices suggest that
the majority decisions ignored “longstanding scholarly and judicial
understanding” of the respective sections of the securities law to reach
policy decisions.146
As discussed supra, our data indicate that any pro-corporate bias in
the Court weakened upon the appointment of Justice O’Connor to the
bench.147 The data do not, however, show any significant gender impact
on a pro-corporate bias. Moreover, this anecdotal evidence suggests that
when a pro-corporate bias was suggested by a decision easing regulations
or making prosecution more difficult, Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg
were more likely to part ways. O’Connor voted to foreclose relief in the
three cases, while Ginsburg voted to provide it. At least in the context of
securities cases, this observation may suggest that ideology, rather than
gender, more often influences decisions.148 Although beyond the scope of

majority opinion and two were 5-4 opinions. One had a concurrence, which neither O’Connor nor
Ginsburg joined.
143
513 U.S. 561 (1995).
144
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
145
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
146
Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 561; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 193-94.
147
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148
See Dixon, supra 43, at 313-14 (stating Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg’s well-recognized
political affiliation as a reputable conservative justice and equally renowned liberal justice,
respectively). The then-President’s political affiliation is often mirrored through his appointed Justice’s
voting behaviors. Id. at 314. See also Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 851 (2009) (noting that ideology influences judicial
decision-making in corporate tax law and economic cases); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping
the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 85—86 (2006) (discussing the impact ideology
has on judicial decision-making); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman & Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity of the
Roberts Court to Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1317 (2008) (finding that
ideology plays a significant role in the “production of noteworthy decisions”).
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this article, we believe that further research on this issue is warranted.
Such research also may make a meaningful contribution to the current
debate regarding the position of the Roberts Court in business cases.
C. Gender in Securities Cases
Our general finding that from 1971 through 2010, gender does not
have an overall effect on the resolution of securities cases is a solid starting
point for considering the future of those cases in the Supreme Court,
particularly as an additional female Justice (Kagan) has taken the bench.
Moreover, our discrete analyses suggesting meaningful trends in, and
associations among, the data further inform this analysis. The tendency of
female-included panels to encourage unanimity while also being more
likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions suggests some gender
relevance. Gender may not be outcome determinative in securities law
cases, but it still may play a role in deliberations and the Court’s decisionmaking process. We believe that further research should explore these
possible effects, as well as the potential influence of ideology in securities
cases.

V. CONCLUSION
Two developments underscore the importance of our findings:
commentators suggest that the Court is more willing to grant certiorari to
business law cases than in the past, and therefore, the Court will decide
many of these cases with at least three female Justices on the bench.149 Our
study demonstrates that, despite no discernible gender impact on the
outcome of securities cases, several issues call for further study and
ongoing observation in light of these two developments. For example, our
data suggest that the presence of one or two female Justices may influence
the way in which the Court deliberates about securities cases, and may
facilitate decisions built around consensus. Perhaps a third Justice will
amplify this effect. This inference may be bolstered (or disproven) by
future securities cases in which Justice Kagan participates, and may be
applicable to other contexts as well. Likewise, further analysis may
uncover quantitative support for our anecdotal observation that ideology
149
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 946 (2009) (noting that the Roberts Court has had business
cases account for one-third to one-half of the Court’s docket in recent years, giving the Court a probusiness reputation); Matt Carter, Note & Comment, Punting on Logic: The Roberts Court to Sack
Small Business Once Again in American Needle v. NFL, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 477, 494 (2010)
(noting that 40% of the Roberts Court cases granted certiorari involved business interests, which is an
increase of 10% compared to the Rehnquist Court).
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may influence the Court’s decisions in securities cases. In addition, the
tempering effect that female Justices have on any pro-corporate bias, at
least in the securities law context, warrants further study. Our study
provides an important baseline for further inquiry to enrich our
understanding of the Court’s conduct in, and the influence of female
Justices on, securities cases that are vital to our capital markets.
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APPENDIX A
Final Coding Scheme Variables
Variable No.
1a
1b
2
3
4
5
6
7
8a
8b
8c
8d
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16a
16b
16c
17a
17b
17c
18a
18b
18c
19a

Variable Description
Date
Year
Identity of Lead Petitioner/Code150
Identity of Petitioner/Narrative
Identity of Respondent/Code151
Identity of Respondent/Narrative
Identity of Plaintiff in Original Complaint
Identity of Defendant in Original Complaint
Whether Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner Involved
Identity of any Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Whether Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Involved
Identity of any Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
History of Case/Appeal from Federal or State Court?
Securities Law Issue Before Supreme Court/Code
Securities Law Issue Before Supreme Court/Narrative
Holding of Court/Party
Holding of Court/Impose Sanction or Liability
Holding of Court/Narrative
Holding of Court/Treatment of Lower Court’s Decision
Number of Votes in Majority152
Justices in Majority
Author of Majority Opinion
Number of Concurring Votes153
Justices Concurring
Author of Concurring Opinion
Number of Votes in Dissent154
Justices in Dissent
Author of Dissenting Opinion
Number of Justices Abstaining

150
Coders could choose from Individual, Institutional Investor (defined as any entity in its capacity
as shareholder of issuer), Corporation, Government, Other. In identifying the petitioner and respondent,
we instructed coders to focus on the first party listed or the “lead” party. Accordingly, the data collected
may not represent every type of party included as a petitioner or a respondent in any given case. We
elected to focus on lead parties for consistency in the database.
151
See supra note 146.
152
We instructed coders to include all Justices joining the majority opinion, as well as any Justice
concurring in judgment.
153
We instructed coders to include all Justices concurring in whole or in part.
154
We instructed coders to include all Justices dissenting in whole or in part.
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Appendix B
Regression Results and Discussion
Predicting Who the Court Held For
We performed a regression to determine which of our legal
variables predicted whom the court finds for, both for the female-included
and overall case samples. This analysis sought to determine which
variables led to a decision for the petitioner or respondent or for both or
neither.
We performed a regression to determine the role of the major legal
variables assessed in this study. We first examined how the variables of
interest affected whom the court voted for in the female-include only cases
(N = 39).
As seen in Table 1, the overall model is significant. Both the
occurrence of an amicus curiae brief for the respondent and the holding
(what the Court held) significantly predicted whom the Court held for.
While the gender variables did not have an effect, whether the majority
opinion was authored by a female did approach significance.155
Outcome

Model Summary
R2

Holding
(WHO)
F(7,39)

F-test

.42 3.21 (p <
.05)*

Coefficient Summary
Predictors

Beta

t-test (sig)

Year
AC-P
AC-R
Issue
Sanctions
Holding-What
Fem Maj Auth

.10
-.26
.41
-.11
.03
-.51
.31

.68 (.50)
-1.53 (.14)
2.52 (.02)*
-.65 (.52)
.19 (.85)
-2.92 (.01)**
1.76 (.09)

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06.
Table 1. Regression with legal measures predicting holding.
We then performed the regression analyses for the overall case
sample (88 cases). As shown in Table 2, the overall model is not
significant. Only respondent amicus curiae is a significant predictor of
155
A complete model with all of the variables was also tested. Females in dissent, female author of
dissent, and the female concurrence variables did not have a significant effect in any of the regressions.
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holding (who), with holding (what) marginally significant. Female author
no longer approaches significance in the overall sample.156
Outcome

Model Summary
R2

Holding
(WHO)
F(7,85)

F-test

.10 1.27 (p = .28)

Coefficient Summary
Predictors
Year
AC-P
AC-R
Issue
Sanctions
HoldingWhat
Fem Maj
Auth

Beta
-.10
-.10
.24
.06
-.12
-.22
.02

t-test (sig)
-.09 (.93)
-1.53 (.14)
2.00 (.049)*
.57 (.57)
-1.02 (.31)
-1.86 (.06)^
.16 (.87)

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06.
Table 2. Regression with legal measures predicting holding.
Additional regressions also determined that a female Justice on the
bench did not significantly predict whom the Court held for, neither when
the only gender-based variable in the regression equation nor when it was
included along with whether a female authored the majority opinion.
Overall, these regression analyses show that including a female Justice
does not predict whether the Court finds for the respondent or petitioner.
Predicting What the Court Held
We then performed the regression analyses to determine if the
variables of interest predicted what the Court holds.
For the smaller sample of cases with female Justices on the bench,
the overall model predicting what the Court held is significant. Both who
the Court held for and whether the majority opinion was written by a
female predicted what the Court held. Thus, we do have a gender effect
here. See Table 3.

156
The degrees of freedom differ from the overall number of cases because not every case had every
variable coded.
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Outcome

Model Summary
R2

Holding
(WHAT)
F(7,39)

F-test

.53 4.95 (p <
.001)***

41

Coefficient Summary
Predictors
Year
AC-P
AC-R
Issue
Sanctions
HoldingWho
Fem Maj
Auth

Beta
.17
.24
.09
-.19
-.06
-.42
.43

t-test (sig)
1.36 (.18)
1.53 (.14)
.58 (.57)
-1.29 (.21)
-.43 (.67)
-2.92
(.006)**
2.99
(.005)**

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06.
Table 3. Regression with legal measures predicting holding.
In the overall sample, the overall model is significant, with whether
there is a female-authored majority opinion as a significant predictor of
what the Court holds. However, it is not a strong model, with R2= .19.
Outcome

Model Summary
R2

Holding
(WHAT)
F(7,85)

F-test

.19 2.58 (p <
.02)*

Coefficient Summary
Predictors
Year
AC-P
AC-R
Issue
Sanctions
HoldingWho
Fem Maj
Auth

Beta
.13
.05
-.05
.00
-.18
-.20
.22

t-test (sig)
1.10 (.28)
.43 (.67)
-.42 (.68)
-.002 (.99)
-1.62 (.11)
-1.86 (.06)^
2.03 (.04)*

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06.
Table 4. Regression with legal measures predicting holding.
Still, these regression analyses find that while the addition of
female Justices did not significantly affect who the Court held for or what
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the Court held, whether the majority opinion was authored by a female
Justice was a significant predictor of what the Court found.

